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Abstract 
In order to improve the effectiveness of the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) response to future international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) missions, an analysis of the demands created by such disasters as well as 
the capabilities of the USMC is necessary.  This research focuses on the primary 
response organization within the USMC: the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and 
those resources available to the MEU to conduct HA/DR operations.  Recent HA/DR 
events are examined to determine how common demands were met by the USMC 
as well as any gaps that may exist that should be addressed to improve future 
effectiveness. 
In this research, we explore the capabilities of the USMC MEU that satisfy 
demands arising from natural disasters. We follow the humanitarian and military core 
competencies framework for studying the USMC capabilities to match the supply 
with the demand from certain past disasters. After compiling and analyzing data from 
multiple USMC publications, historical records of disasters, and the USMC response 
to those disasters, we identify those capabilities provided by the USMC that are the 
most critical and unique with respect to the conduct of HA/DR missions. We 
collected data for the 2007 cyclone on the southwest coast of Bangladesh, the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami.  We selected these 
disasters due to their impact and the level of involvement of the USMC in relief 
operations. 
Keywords: Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, HADR, Marine 
expeditionary unit, Bangladesh Cyclone Sidr, Operation Sea Angel II, Haiti 
earthquake 2010, Operation Unified Response, Great East Japan earthquake and 
tsunami, Operation Tomodachi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An analysis of past Marine Corps humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) operations can help assess relief demand and supply capabilities.  Given 
the current operational climate of U.S. military forces around the world, it is 
imperative that the Marine Corps Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is properly 
implemented while performing foreign disaster relief operations. 
A. MOTIVATION 
As the U.S. military exits Afghanistan and prepares for a likely period of 
peacetime, non-combat operations provide a means for combatant commanders to 
engage in theater shaping.  The Marine Corps provides critical assets for these 
missions through its MEUs, which are flexible and adaptable to accomplish a wide 
range of operations, including non-combat missions.  These natural disasters create 
a demand for the relief capabilities inherent to the MEUs.  By seeking to reduce 
redundancy and focus on capabilities that are unique and provide an unfilled 
demand, the MEUs will provide more effective relief and reduce the effects of a 
disaster.  Although the MEU response will undoubtedly provide levels of aid and 
relief, it is critical that the Marine Corps allocate its assets effectively to accurately 
match its supply of relief with the demand created by the disaster.   
B. BACKGROUND 
As identified in Figure 1, as the world population has risen, the occurrence of 
disasters has impacted an increasing number of people, presenting greater 
challenges to humanitarian aid responders.  Given this rising trend, it is likely that 
the MEU and Marine forces will face an increasing demand for HA/DR capabilities 
and response. 
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Figure 1. Number of People Reported Affected by Natural Disasters, 1900–
2011  
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2011) 
C. OPERATIONAL VALUE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER 
RELIEF 
HA/DR operations also provide a means for military leaders to shape areas of 
responsibility (AORs) by providing aid and enhancing global perception of the U.S. 
military while exerting influence through the socioeconomic and geopolitical factors 
and infrastructure of affected nations (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
[OASD], 2011).  Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 listed preventing and 
responding to disasters in the top five priorities under the National Strategic Planning 
Guidance (Office of Naval Research [ONR], 2008).  Based on this strategy, the 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard collectively issued maritime strategic 
imperatives for creating and developing international partnerships to prevent and 
limit the effects of global disruptions (ONR, 2008).  HA/DR operations will 
undoubtedly be utilized to accomplish the goals of the Marine Corps’ strategy for 
future operations in support of the national strategy. 
D. MILITARY 
In the event of a large-scale foreign disaster, the U.S. military is uniquely 
capable of providing extensive logistics, strategic lift, engineering, and medical 
support to austere and complex devastated environments within aggressive time 
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lines.  Although these events are sporadic and relatively low in frequency, their 
severity creates a demand for assistance that is most readily supplied by the U.S. 
military (OASD, 2011).  Furthermore, due to its structure, the U.S. military is able to 
provide a wide range of support, including security, transportation and logistics, 
construction and repair, command and control communications, medical care, 
subject matter experts, and civil support (Pettit & Beresford, 2005).  The military is 
well suited to respond immediately and operate in all areas, even where 
infrastructure and stability may be completely lacking. 
E. NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provide similar capabilities as 
military actors but are generally limited to specific missions, such as the provision of 
meals or medical care.  Accordingly, NGOs often provide greater quantities of aid 
within their specific competencies but lack the range of operations, which leads to 
NGO reliance on military assets to provide logistical support for supply movement 
(Apte & Yoho, 2012).  
F. NAVY AND MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS 
MEUs combine equipment and personnel from the Unites States Marine 
Corps (USMC) aboard U.S. Navy vessels, creating an amphibious ready group 
(ARG).  The capabilities of the MEU are enhanced by naval support, but when 
disembarked, MEU capabilities consist only of organic personnel and equipment. 
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Our analysis of the USMC MEU responses to HA/DR events focuses on 
significant, foreign disaster relief operations requiring the employment of an entire 
MEU or larger Marine air-ground task force within the last 10 years.  The three 
events analyzed are Operations Sea Angel II, Unified Response, and Tomodachi.  
During these operations, USMC MEUs responded to the 2007 cyclone in 
Bangladesh, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2011 Japanese earthquake and 
subsequent tsunami, respectively.  These operations are the most recent examples 
of how a USMC MEU was utilized to conduct aid and relief operations.  We selected 
the disasters on the basis of presenting a representation of recent disasters.  These 
disasters affected nations ranging from an underdeveloped third world nation to a 
well-organized and modern first world nation, and present an acceptable level of 
sources of data collected from relief operations.  We did not examine responses to 
domestic disasters, due to legal and logistical considerations, which significantly 
separate international American military responses from domestic operations. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
We analyzed the operations using both USMC reports and government and 
organizational reviews of response in order to identify strengths and weaknesses of 
the MEU response.  Additionally, we evaluated the overall response of all 
responders to identify the strengths, shortages, and gaps in the response.  We 
sought to identify demand and responses by the USMC in these disasters.  In the 
research, we attempted to match the hard and soft assets of the USMC MEU to the 
demand for HA/DR created by the previously mentioned disasters. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous research in the field of HA/DR identified classifications for disasters 
as well as categories for military HA/DR response; evaluating these sources in an 
objective format enhances the understanding of disasters.  This research, when 
matched with the current composition of the MEU, provides a firm foundation for 
evaluating the MEU’s response to foreign disasters. 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
Disasters have historically been classified as either natural or manmade, but 
recent models seek to classify disasters based on the size of the affected location 
and the tempo of the disaster (Apte, 2009).  This classification system provides 
insight into the complexity of the disaster and the difficulty of the response efforts, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 6 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
based on inherent characteristics of the disaster.  Disasters that are widespread are 
more challenging to respond to than those that are localized, and disasters that 
strike without warning cause more destruction when preparation and evacuation are 
lacking (Apte, 2009).  Figure 2 indicates the level of difficulty as a product of location 
and time. 
 
Figure 2. Classification of Disasters  
(Apte, 2009, p. 14) 
Response to any level of disaster must accomplish several capabilities to 
meet a wide range of demand for HA/DR.  These necessary response deliverables 
include information and knowledge management, needs assessment, supply, 
deployment and distribution, health service support, and collaboration/governance 
(Apte, 2009).  Without understanding the current situation, it is impossible to properly 
respond.  The generation and dissemination of information is the first step in 
preparing an appropriate plan to provide relief in the wake of a disaster.  This 
capability provides the responder with the critical information it needs to get the right 
support to the right place and the right people.  Information gathering and data 
collection serve to develop the responder’s overall situational awareness and serve 






II: dispersed and                  
slow-onset
IV: dispersed and                  
sudden-onset
I: localized and                     
slow-onset
III: localized and                    
sudden-onset
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A needs assessment seeks to determine what demand exists for relief and 
aid.  This can be achieved using a variety of metrics, which can be tailored to 
individual cases.  The needs assessment is a product of the intelligence-gathering 
phase and fuses the data collected from a variety of sources into a developed 
awareness of what is required to accomplish a given mission while operating within 
the scope and guidelines established.  Needs assessments are critical for matching 
the appropriate resources to the right demand; in the event of a disconnect, 
inefficiencies are introduced, and capabilities are lost (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
A supply system is a major enabler to response and extends further than just 
what the responder is equipped with.  Supply includes the processes of 
procurement, positioning, storing, and inventory maintenance of a responder’s 
assets (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  The supply chain of response is also a critical factor in 
determining overall capability.  Organic assets, as well as the capability for resupply, 
greatly influence the scope and duration of relief operations, ultimately determining 
the flexibility of response (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
Transporting supplies to the end user is the overall goal of deployment and 
distribution.  This capability is generally referred to as lift, or the ability to transport 
personnel, goods, and equipment from staging areas to the disaster area and 
distribution locations (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  Significantly, naval services utilize the 
ocean as a maneuver area to establish sea basing capability on ships and then 
employ sealift and airlift platforms to deliver aid to the end user, with rotary-wing 
airlift assets providing the most flexibility (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
Virtually all disasters cause loss of life and casualties, as well as displaced 
persons.  Accordingly, health services support must be provided to prevent further 
loss of life and relieve pain and suffering (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  Large-scale medical 
operations involve naval hospital ships but are extremely cost intensive.  Less costly 
but effective options include field hospitals and medical personnel embedded with 
ground units to provide individual care (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
Finally, collaboration and governance provide responders with a means to 
coordinate efforts and increase efficiency.  HA/DR operations are likely to include 
numerous nations, agencies, and NGOs as well as host-nation governments. 
Additionally, these players are operating in a chaotic and constantly changing 
environment.  Without deliberate collaboration and coordination, relief efforts are 
unlikely to achieve the highest effectiveness possible (Apte & Yoho, 2012).  
Furthermore, a well-defined command structure working with local governments, 
authorities, and community members facilitates the successful completion of HA/DR 
operations (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Figure 3 shows the relationship between military 
and non-military capabilities and how they fulfill the required capabilities in support of 
a disaster. 
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Figure 3. Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies  
(Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 15) 
Note. This figure was adapted from Joint Publication 4-0. 
2. United States Marine Corps  
Known for its expeditionary capabilities, the Marine Corps organizes its forces 
in a specific structure to facilitate rapid deployment and self-sustainability.  Across 
the range of military operations, the Marine Corps tailors its personnel and 
equipment to adapt to the response required. 
a. Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
The USMC’s primary fighting organization is the Marine air-ground task 
force (MAGTF; OASD, 2011).  This structure combines the main warfighting 
components of the Marine Corps and enables the self-sufficiency and sustainability 
that distinguishes it from the other branches of service.  Each MAGTF consists of a 
command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), logistics combat element 
(LCE), and air combat element (ACE; United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2011).  
Each MAGTF consists of these four elements, which provide the Marines the ability 
to be utilized across the range of military operations. 
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There are four types of MAGTFs, three of which are differentiated by 
size.  The largest is the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), consisting mainly of an 
infantry division, combat logistics group, and Marine aircraft wing.  Next, the Marine 
expeditionary brigade (MEB) is composed of an infantry regiment, combat logistics 
regiment, and Marine aircraft group (USMC, 2011).  The fourth category of MAGTFs 
is the special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF), which is created and structured for a 
specific requirement and can range in size according to mission objectives (USMC, 
2011).  The smallest traditional MAGTF is the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), 
consisting of an infantry battalion, combat logistics battalion, and Marine aircraft 
squadron. 
b. Marine Expeditionary Unit 
At any given time, the Marine Corps has a minimum of three MEUs 
deployed throughout the world.  The 31st MEU is stationary in Okinawa, Japan.  The 
other two are sourced from three MEUs on the East and West Coasts of the 
continental United States.  The 22d, 24th, and 26th MEUs are located in Camp 
Lejeune, NC, and the 11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs are based out of Camp Pendleton, 
CA (USMC, 2011). 
According to Marine Corps policy, MCO 3120.9C describes the MEU 
as a rapid response force whose mission is to  
provide a forward deployed, flexible, sea-based Marine Air Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) capable of conducting Amphibious Operations, 
Crisis Response and limited contingency operations, to include 
enabling the introduction of follow on forces, and designated special 
operations, in order to support the theatre requirements of Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (GCC). (USMC, 2009, p. 4) 
Marine Corps policy dictates that the MEU must possess five 
characteristics to ensure mission readiness.  First, the MEU must accomplish a sea-
based forward presence.  Regardless of the geographic location of the mission, the 
MEU must be able to operate within the designated AOR independent of support 
from other nations.  This is accomplished through the MEU’s use of naval platforms 
and naval ARG to provide mobile basing for global operations (USMC, 2009). 
As the title of the MEU suggests, it must be expeditionary in nature.  
This includes a high level of training and proficiency in areas spanning the range of 
military operations so that when called upon, the MEU can deploy a flexible and 
adept force into austere environments while meeting urgent time lines (USMC, 
2009). 
Next, every MEU must possess the capability of crisis action planning 
and response (USMC, 2012).  Threats and situations often develop rapidly and 
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require commanders to complete the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) in a 
matter of hours, with the target time being fewer than six hours.  The MEU command 
must be able to use limited and incomplete information to generate an executable 
plan, the 80% solution.  This requires command continuity through all levels and 
elements as well as a force capable of a flexible and immediate response (USMC, 
2009). 
A requirement for any MAGTF, the MEU must function with combined 
arms integration.  Achieving synergy and unity of effort through the employment of 
fires and maneuver from units internal to the MEU, as well as external supporters 
such as naval gunfire, is critical to mission success and confronts the enemy with a 
combined arms dilemma that is direct and indirect fires combined with the tactical 
maneuver of forces that overwhelm the enemy (USMC, 2009). 
Finally, an MEU must implement the concept of interoperability into its 
operational capabilities.  Training and operating under a joint command 
environment, to include special forces, enhances the flexibility and effectiveness of 
the MEU by increasing proficiencies and maximizing the utility of strategic assets 
(USMC, 2009). 
When forward deployed, the MEU is expected to be able to complete 
four core missions: amphibious operations, special operations, crisis 
response/limited contingency operations, and expeditionary support to other 
operations (USMC, 2009).  Projecting naval power ashore is the key tenet of 
amphibious operations and consists of amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, 
maritime interceptions, and advance force operations.  Providing high levels of both 
skill and flexibility, special operations include direct action operations, special 
reconnaissance, and foreign internal defense operations.  Meeting America’s 
emergency diplomatic and kinetic action requirements, crisis response/limited 
contingency operations, as well as expeditionary support to other operations 
encompasses the following: noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian 
assistance, stability operations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, joint and 
combined operations, aviation operations from expeditionary shore-based sites, 
theater security cooperation, and airfield/port seizure (USMC, 2009). 
c. MEU Structure 
Table 1 identifies a sample structure for an MEU. Its composition 
provides the MEU commander with the capability and resources of air, ground, and 
logistics assets, including attachments and detachments of specialized skills such as 
chemical biological radiological nuclear (CBRN) and others. This allows the MEU to 
operate independently in a host of environments and missions depending on the 
needs of the combatant commander. 
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Table 1. Notional MEU/MEU (SOC) Structure and Organization  
(Based on USMC, 2009, p. 11) 
 
d. Equipment 
For military operations other than war (MOOTW), including HA/DR, the 
MEU can be equipped with a host of assets. The following is a sample composition 
of key equipment: 
 (105 ea.) high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) 
trucks 
 (15 ea.) assault amphibious vehicles 
 (31 ea.) 7-ton trucks 
 (1 ea.) excavator 
 (2 ea.) TRAM forklifts 
 (12 ea.) MV-22B Ospreys 
 (2 ea.) tactical water purification systems 












command and control is 
provided by the Command 
Element
The GCE is structured around 
a reinforced infantry battalion
The ACE is a 
composite/reinforced 
squadron structured around 
Medium Lift or Tilt-Rotor 
Squadron
The LCE is structured 
around Combat Logistic 
Battalion (CLB) provides the 
following
The MSOC is a special 
operations force partnered 




personnel: USMC: 25 OFF 
and 140 ENL, USN: 1 OFF 
and 3 ENL
Approximately 1200 
personnel: USMC: 59 OFF 
and 1086 ENL, USN: 3 OFF 
and 50 ENL
Approximately 417 
personnel: USMC: 75 OFF 
and 337 ENL, USN: 1 OFF 
and 4 ENL
Approximately 273 
personnel: USMC: 14 OFF 
and 232 ENL, USN: 6 OFF 
and 21 ENL
Approximately 84 personnel: 






Medium Lift or Tilt-Rotor 
Squadron
Headquarters and Service 
Platoon
Company HQ
Imagery Interpretation Det Rifle Company x 3
Heavy Helicopter Squadron 
Det
Communications Platoon
Marine Special Operations 
Teams (MSOT) x 3




Enablers: Admin, EOD, 
Riggers, Maintenance, 
Supply, Ammo Techs, Fire 
Control Team, Embark
Ground Sensor Det Tank Platoon
Marine Attack Squadron 
Det
Supply Platoon  
Topographic Det Artillery Battery
Marine Fighter / Attack 
Squadron Det (Tethered)
Transportation Support 
Platoon (Includes Landing 
Support & Motor 
Transportation)
 
Radio Battalion Det LAR Platoon/Company
Marine Aerial Refueler / 
Transport Squadron Det
Health Services Platoon  
Communications Battalion 
Det
Shore Fire Control Party
Marine Air Control Group 
Det














Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
Platoon
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 (1 ea.) 5,000 lb. forklift 
 (1 ea.) extended boom forklift 
 (1 ea.) D7 bulldozer 
 (4 ea.) CH-53E Super Stallions 
 (3 ea.) UH-1N Hueys 
 (2 ea.) KC-130 Hercules 
(USMC, 2009) 
As seen in Table 2, carrying this assortment of heavy equipment enables the 
MEU to provide a wide range of support, including supply delivery and personnel 
transport that could be applied during a humanitarian crisis or disaster mission. 
Table 2. Sample MEU Baseline Equipment  
(Based on USMC, 2009, p. 12) 
 
(1) MEWSS LAV (7) LAVs (12) CH-46E/MV-22B (2) TWPS (16) HMMWVs
(18) HMMWVs (15) AAVs/EFVs (4) CH-53E (5) Refuelers (4) Trailers
(1) JTF Enabler (4) Tanks *** (4) AH-1W (1) M88A1
(6) CRRCs* (6) M777A2 (3) UH-1N/Y (15) MTVRs
(20) CRRCs** (6) AV-8B (18) HMMWVs
(2) ACEs (5) A-MANPADS (1) AAVR7
(16) MTVRs (5) HMMWVs (1) 5k Forklift
(8) 81 MMs (2) KC-130 (1) EBFL Forklift
(8) TOW Launchers (6) F/A-18 ***** (1) D-7
(64) HMMWVs (1) Excavator
(7) IFAVs (2) TRAM Forklift













31st MEU does not embark.
The EFSS (120mm mortar) may be employed in place of the M777, in conjunction with the
M777 (reduced numbers for both), or not at all.




Marine Special Operations Company
CONUS deploying MEUs embark (6) CRRCs.
31st MEU embark (20) CRRCs.
CE BLT ACE LCE MSOC
Command Element
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III. THE DISASTERS 
The disasters discussed in the following sections were selected due to their 
recent occurrence as well as the availability of data and information of the response 
of the USMC MEU and other organizations. 
A. SEA ANGEL II 
On November 15, 2007, the southwest coast of Bangladesh was ravaged by 
Cyclone Sidr, which caused high winds and flooding.  As a result, more than 3,200 
people were killed, an estimated 40,000 people were injured, over 1.6 million acres 
of farmland were devastated, and 350,000 head of livestock were killed (Command 
Element, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing [CE 3D MAW], 2008).  The day after the cyclone 
struck, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) released Tasking Order P-137, ultimately 
resulting in the assignment of the Kearsage Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and 
the 31st MEU (CE 3D MAW, 2008).  Additionally, a humanitarian assistance survey 
team (HAST) sourced from III MEF was authorized to be deployed to the disaster 
area (CE 3D MAW, 2008).   
The HAST was tasked with liaising with the Bangladesh government, the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and response team 
leadership as well as assessing the situation and developing plans for HA/DR 
actions to be executed by follow-on responders.  Finally, the HAST was ordered to 
inform the government of Bangladesh of the assistance currently en route to the 
country while seeking approval to provide the aid (CE 3D MAW, 2008). Six days 
after the disaster, the government of Bangladesh accepted America’s offer for aid, 
and two days later, on November 23, III MEF received its executive order to provide 
relief (CE 3D MAW, 2008). 
When tasked to provide relief to the Bangladesh disaster, III MEF tasked 3d 
MEB to  
conduct HA/DR operations in partnership with the Government of 
Bangladesh and Host Nation agencies in order to reduce further loss of 
life, mitigate suffering, reduce the scope of the disaster and set 
conditions for transition of sustainable efforts to the Government of 
Bangladesh and Non-Governmental Organizations. On order, the MEB 
will transition operations to appropriate government agencies and 
redeploy forces to home station. (CE 3D MAW, 2008, p. 3) 
From the onset of the operation, the Marine Corps’ policy of creating short-term relief 
solutions was evident.  Brigadier General Bailey, 3d MEB commanding general, 
affirmed the short duration of operations when he stated, “We are here until the 
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major critical items associated with the disaster relief are delivered” (CE 3D MAW, 
2008, p. 6). 
As a direct result of the HAST’s evaluation, 3d MEB set to develop a plan to 
first liaise with the local government and develop a plan of action.  Then, the MEB 
began supply distribution operations, using sea, air, and land assets.  Finally, the 
Marines began to transition operations to the local government and NGOs as U.S. 
personnel redeployed (CE 3D MAW, 2008).  Once on the ground, 3d MEB began 
providing aid with the following priorities: (a) water distribution and storage, (b) 
distribution and lift, and (c) preventive and primary medical care.  These priorities 
were supported by the HAST assessment and the Bangladesh government’s 
requests.  Notably, the Marine leadership proposed establishing a secondary 
logistics distribution center along the southeast coast of Bangladesh in order to 
provide increased support.  However, because the government of Bangladesh 
opposed the notion, only one primary debarkation point was utilized during the relief 
operation (CE 3D MAW, 2008). 
B. UNIFIED RESPONSE  
On January 2, 2010, an earthquake struck 14 miles away from the capital city 
of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, registering a 7.0 on the Richter scale.  The earthquake 
affected 3.9 million people, including 2 million people in the capital city, where more 
than 60% of the government infrastructure and 14 of the 16 ministry headquarters 
were destroyed (Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2010).  It was estimated that 
230,000 people were killed and 197,000 injured (Command Element, II Marine 
Expeditionary Force [CE II MEF], 2010).  Additionally, areas within a 41-mile radius 
of the epicenter experienced severe to moderate damage, causing the government 
of Haiti to declare a state of national emergency and request assistance from the 
United States (Commanding Officer, Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task 
Force, Africa Partnership Station 10 [CO, SCMAGTF, APS-10], 2010). 
Upon verbal order from the joint forces command (JFCOM), II MEF prepared 
the 22d and 24th MEUs for deployment to Haiti.  The MEUs were assigned to two 
ARGs along with several other U.S. Navy units, as well as African Partnership 
Station 10 (APS-10).  The group, titled Joint Task Force–Haiti (JTF–H), was tasked 
with providing HA/DR to Haiti, which was named Operation Unified Response (CE II 
MEF, 2010).  The task force focused efforts on establishing sea-based operations 
from which it could manage a hub-and-spoke–style distribution network of relief 
supplies.  Initial and continuing guidance for the MEU personnel was to provide food, 
water, and critical medical aid to those affected by the disaster, as evidenced 
through U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOCOM’s) mission to “deploy assets to Haiti 
to conduct search and rescue operations, damage assessments, and transition to 
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sustained humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations in order to prevent 
human suffering and additional loss of life” (CE II MEF, 2010, p. 7). 
Prior to the earthquake, 300 charities with more than 3,000 workers were 
operating in Haiti.  These charities were striving to improve the third world country 
standard of living in Haiti.  The goal of U.S. involvement was to prevent the loss of 
life, then facilitate the existing charities’ efforts to rebuild the affected area (CE II 
MEF, 2010). 
Four main phases were established during the planning of Operation Unified 
Response, including crisis relief, life sustainment, infrastructure restoration, and 
multilateral reconstruction and development.  On January 18, the 22d MEU arrived 
in Haiti, followed by APS-10 on January 18, and the 24th MEU, which arrived on 
January 24 (Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2010).  During the initial phase, 
JTF–H was established with a command and control capability that provided liaison 
opportunity between the U.S. military, diplomatic leadership, USAID, and the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  This command and control 
organization also established a humanitarian aid coordination center to manage the 
relief efforts of the government of Haiti, USAID, the United Nations, and NGOs 
providing relief to the disaster (CE II MEF, 2010).  MV-22 Osprey aircraft were used 
by the 24th MEU to survey the damage of the earthquake, complete an assessment 
of affected areas, and dispel false reports of damage in northern Haiti.  The 24th 
MEU also completed assessments of infrastructure in the northern area of Haiti and 
an assessment of relief distribution capabilities in the southern portion of the country 
(CE II MEF, 2010).  Additionally, Marines from the MEUs were deployed into the 
joint operations area (JOA) to provide immediate lifesaving for critical situations (CE 
II MEF, 2010). 
Next, JTF–H engaged in structure relief.  This process began with the arrival 
of the World Food Program NGO and the large-scale supplies of food.  The strategy 
of distribution was to use the MEUs’ rotary-wing assets to distribute food and water 
supplies using a hub-and-spoke distribution model while providing a steady state of 
supply (CE II MEF, 2010).  The initial part of this phase ended when USAID was 
capable of meeting the demand for relief supplies and a working structure had been 
established (CE II MEF, 2010). 
After relief operations were saturated by the World Food Program and USAID 
was meeting residual demand, JTF–H began the transition phase of operations.  
The phases of infrastructure restoration and multilateral reconstruction and 
development were canceled, and the task force began relinquishing responsibility to 
the government of Haiti as well as MINUSTAH.  This included transferring seaport 
and airfield control as well as the transfer of relief operations under the control of the 
government of Haiti, USAID, and other authorized NGOs (CE II MEF, 2010). 
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C. OPERATION TOMODACHI 
On March 11, 2011, mainland Japan suffered an earthquake that registered 
8.9 on the Richter scale and caused a tsunami that struck the north Pacific coast of 
Japan and measured over 30 feet at its highest point (Command Element, 3d Marine 
Division [CE 3D MARDIV], 2011).  The disaster killed 14,898 people, injured 5,270 
more, and left almost 10,000 unaccounted for.  In addition, the tsunami caused a 
catastrophic failure of the cooling system at the Fukushima nuclear power station, 
which led to the explosive meltdown of the nuclear reactor.  It was estimated that all 
damage combined exceeded $300 billion (Command Element, 3D Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade [CE 3D MEB], 2011). 
Immediately following the earthquake, the Japanese prime minister declared 
a state of emergency, and Japanese emergency responders as well as the 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) began operations in the wake of the 
devastation.  On the evening of the disaster, the prime minister formally requested 
assistance from U.S. forces through the U.S. embassy.  Upon being notified of the 
disaster, III MEF stood up a crisis action team (CAT) and began the planning 
process and resource assessment in support of generating a response plan to the 
disaster (CE 3D MEB, 2011). 
In the early morning of March 12, the commanding general of U.S. Forces 
Japan authorized III MEF to deploy the first phase of responders to the disaster 
area.  The force was made up of the forward command element (FCE) of 3d MEB, 
including four HASTs, and was transported by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to 
Japan (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  The HASTs from the FCE assessed that the host 
nation’s response plan was well organized and an effective strategy was in place.  
However, even with their years of training and preparation, Japanese responders 
were overwhelmed by the size of the disaster (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  Additionally, the 
FCE based its recommended priority of work upon the U.S. Office of Disaster 
Assistance priorities, which are airfield management, humanitarian aid airlift/delivery 
and reception support, communication support, medical aid, search and rescue, and 
critical infrastructure recovery.  During the time that the FCE was operating, the Air 
Force Special Operation Command’s 320th Squadron began clearing and repairing 
the Sendai Airport but was overwhelmed by the size and complexity of the project 
(CE 3D MEB, 2011). 
The FCE was able to provide assistance by creating Task Force Fuji, which 
consisted of a logistically focused group sourced from Combat Logistics Regiment 
35 from Marine Corps Base, Camp Butler, Okinawa, Japan, among other 
contributors (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  The task force assumed the heavy lift and 
equipment requirements of the airport recovery, allowing the 320th Squadron 
members to focus on other vital reconstruction areas.  This facilitated the rapid 
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completion of the project, and the airport was reopened in a matter of days.  The 
airport enabled the delivery of over 872 tons of supplies, including water, food, 
hygiene kits, and food (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  As a continuation of infrastructure 
recovery, the FCE engaged and facilitated the delivery of critically needed fuel; 
clearing of debris from schools for use as shelters, as well as from the Kesenumma-
Oshima seaport; clearing of debris from the Sendai-Tohoku Shinkansen railroad 
station; and the restoration of power to the Oshima Islands (CE 3D MEB, 2011). 
On March 15, U.S. Forces Japan was tasked with providing the following end 
state:  
HA/DR assistance to the Government of Japan/JSDF has been 
effective in alleviating suffering of the Japanese populous.  U.S. 
Assistance is no longer requested by the Government of Japan.  
Temporary operating locations have been returned to the Government 
of Japan in good condition.  The U.S./Japan alliance is strengthened. 
(Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned [MCCLL], 2011, p. 16) 
The commander’s intent was to ensure that the HA/DR operations would be 
completed using interagency cooperation and coordinated with other key players 
(CE 3D MEB, 2011). 
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IV. ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION 
In the following sections, the actions completed in support of the disasters are 
evaluated on the basis of efficiency in meeting demand of the competencies and 
capabilities of the MEU. 
A. SEA ANGEL II (BANGLADESH CYCLONE) 
1.  Information and Knowledge Management 
Information managers, successfully implemented by the Cooperative for 
Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), were able to liaise between local 
governance, other responders, media, and other groups and increased the flow of 
information and improved the organization’s decision-making (Tod, Alam, Wahra, 
Hoque, & Begum, 2008). Furthermore, prepositioned and prepared assessment 
teams that were immediately deployed proved critical to the success of CARE relief 
operations.  The NGO noted that data were readily available and were compiled into 
useful information through collection and management teams that were able to 
quickly identify needs as well as the extent and location of damage (Tod et al., 
2008). Interpreters and other mediums of communication were required for 
interacting with victims of the cyclone since a large portion of the population in 
Bangladesh was illiterate.  Audio transmissions were noted as the most effective 
means for communicating to affected populations in order to distribute information 
(Tatham, Spens, & Oloruntoba, 2009). 
Communication also became a learning point during USMC relief operations.  
Plaintext high-frequency radios provided the best capability for communications from 
ship to shore.  Liaisons, command cells, agency leadership, and NGO leadership 
must be able to complete crosstalk among tactical, operational, and strategic 
communications, creating the need for a robust communication infrastructure (CE 
3D MAW, 2008).  Furthermore, HA/DR operations require extensive public affairs 
efforts that educate the host and international population on the status goals of 
operations (CE 3D MAW, 2008). 
2. Needs Assessment 
Following the cyclone, the government of Bangladesh began evaluating the 
effects of the disaster as well as assessing the needs of affected populations.  
Completing these assessments led the government to prioritize the following 
responses: food aid, nutrition, water, sanitation, and shelter and disease 
surveillance.  Through coordination with the United Nations as well as NGOs such 
as the Red Crescent, the government of Bangladesh was able to identify demand for 
relief through their assessments and coordinate the appropriate responses 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 20 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
(Government of Bangladesh [GoB], 2008). With winter approaching, blankets and 
cold-weather clothing was determined an urgent need for survivors of the cyclone. 
Unlike other HA/DR operations, it was determined that community involvement in the 
initial needs assessment was not necessary due to the homogenous demand of 
food, water, shelter, and sanitation across the entire impacted area (Tod et al., 
2008).   
After the operation concluded on December 6, one main takeaway was the 
critical role that the HAST played in identifying both the severity and the scope of 
disaster and requesting the appropriate response and capabilities (supply) to match 
the needs identified (demand).  This initial survey provided invaluable information for 
the planning and preparation of large-scale relief efforts.  The success of the HAST 
relies on the proper staffing of the team that represents all major warfighting 
functions, including the ability to conduct an airfield survey (CE 3D MAW, 2008).  
Another key to the success of the HAST was the use of commercial aircraft and 
diplomatic and tourist passports.  This allowed the team to operate as non-intrusively 
as possible and avoid some of the administrative friction that is tied to the movement 
of military forces on the host nation’s soil (Command Element, 3D Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade  [CE 3D MEB], 2008). 
Red Crescent conducted four immediate assessments utilizing aircraft, which 
allowed the organization to identify areas of damage, the urgent need for potable 
water, the demand for clothing and shelter as well as infrastructure restoration, and 
health service requirements and finally determine the necessity of emergency 
logistics control centers.  Air assets allowed the assessment teams to cover the vast 
areas devastated by the storm without needing to use the severely damaged roads 
and waterways (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
[IFRC], 2010).  Unfortunately, while attempting to formulate a standard needs 
assessment, the United Nations lost momentum in its relief operations and fell 
behind the tempo of other responders.  The United Nations completed its 
assessment report on November 22, when numerous other organizations had 
already begun aid distribution and relief operations (Tod et al., 2008).   
3. Supply 
Search and rescue operations commenced immediately after the storm 
passed and lasted for several days.  Since the affected regions were largely 
impoverished, most homes and structures were poorly constructed and, as a result, 
were mostly destroyed by the storm surge and winds (GoB, 2008).  The debris 
created by destroyed buildings and infrastructure created a high demand for search 
and rescue operations, which reached their peak on November 17, two days after 
the cyclone.  As the likelihood of finding survivors diminished after several days, 
search and rescue operations appropriately transitioned to recovery and debris-
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removal operations (GoB, 2008).  The immediate commencement of search and 
rescue operations was well executed and proved critical to preventing further loss of 
life. In addition to loss of life, infrastructure was severely damaged in the districts 
affected by the cyclone, causing losses of electricity and communication lines (GoB, 
2008). Most devastated areas immediately lost electricity after the cyclone, but due 
to prepositioning of power company supplies and personnel, power was restored to 
most areas within five days.  Because of the mass destruction to housing and 
infrastructure, demand for electricity immediately following the disaster dropped.  
Within the affected districts, hard-lined telecommunications were severely degraded 
as a result of destroyed physical lines of communication.  However, the survival of 
most communication towers ensured that wireless communications were minimally 
impacted (GoB, 2008). 
The most important initial supply was clean drinking water, which was 
provided from ships and transported using rotary-wing assets and landing craft, air 
cushion (LCACs).  Reverse osmosis equipment was not utilized due to the potential 
dependency that it would create, but four water purification units provided by USAID 
were delivered by the MEB to local distribution centers (CE 3D MAW, 2008).  Clean 
drinking water supplies fell short of demand and proved critical after the storm since 
most water sources (wells and ponds) were contaminated by sea water and waste 
resulting from the storm surge (GoB, 2008).  The MEU was criticized for a lack of 
organic relief supplies, and appropriately, responders recommended that MEUs 
work with USAID to provide daily family-portioned meals for distribution (CE 3D 
MAW, 2008).  Since a majority of supplies were delivered from USAID directly to 
inland airports, the sealift capability of the MEB was degraded.  The MEB’s lift 
assets and main forces were stationed on ships, so an additional step was added for 
rotary-wing assets delivering supplies to land airports.  If USAID would complete 
replenishments at sea (RASs), the MEB could embark the goods directly from the 
ships and deliver them more efficiently via helicopter or LCAC (CE 3D MEB, 2008).  
Additionally, roughly half of all damage created by the cyclone was attributed 
to housing structures (Tod et al., 2008). Since housing was significantly impacted by 
the storm, a high demand for shelter was generated in the early phases of response.  
The government of Bangladesh provided reconstruction support as well as financial 
aid for rebuilding homes, which provided a long-term solution but did not provide 
immediate relief (GoB, 2008). Mosquito nets and soaps were demanded because of 
the destruction of household items and were utilized to prevent the spread of 
diseases and sickness (Tod et al., 2008). 
4. Deployment and Distribution 
Over 8,000 km of roadways and over 2,000 km of waterways were destroyed 
by the cyclone, severely crippling transportation in the affected districts.  Due to the 
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reduced traffic ability of road- and waterways, a high demand for rotary-wing assets 
was created for the immediate distribution of relief (GoB, 2008). The damaged road 
conditions and destroyed distribution routes, combined with a shortage of trucks, 
created a severe challenge for delivering supplies.  As a result, many remote 
locations were inaccessible for responders, thus increasing tensions and friction 
among the survivor population (IFRC, 2010).  These tensions could lead to instability 
and a lack of order, especially at distribution points, which would severely interfere 
with relief operations.  
Distribution also presented a challenge for U.S. Marines since lift capabilities 
were limited.  It was discovered that tactical sites should be established for 
distribution of relief supplies, which should be conducted by local authorities (CE 3D 
MAW, 2008).  Using local Bangladesh military as formal authority figures to govern 
the tactical distribution of supplies allowed for a coordinated and decentralized 
distribution plan (CE 3D MEB, 2008).  It was recommended that mobile medical 
teams be implemented for HA/DR operations, with an interpreter assigned to each 
care provider while using the interagency emergency health kits (CE 3D MAW, 
2008). 
Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft served a crucial role in assessing the disaster 
as well as distributing supplies.  Overall, the large-scale Marine Corps response took 
fewer than two weeks and made significant accomplishments in facilitating the 
international response to the crisis (CE 3D MAW, 2008). 
5. Health Service Support 
With hundreds of thousands of heads of livestock killed, as well as thousands 
of people, the military of Bangladesh was tasked with burying the dead in order to 
prevent the spread of disease.  This response was executed within two days of the 
cyclone impacting Bangladesh and was expedited by prepositioning responders due 
to early warning of the storm (GoB, 2008).  
During early relief operations, medical care facilities were overwhelmed by 
demand.  More facilities for medical treatment were needed to care for the victims of 
the disaster. Mobile health teams used by the Red Crescent during early response 
operations were effective in reaching remote locations to distribute care as well as 
medical and hygiene supplies.  Although these mobile health operations were ended 
prematurely due to funding, the teams proved effective in reaching over 80,000 
victims (IFRC, 2010). 
Prior to the cyclone, pit latrines were the common form of sanitation in 
Bangladesh.  The flooding from the storm combined with the destruction of 70% of 
these latrines in rural areas created large-scale contamination of drinking water and 
the spread of waterborne diseases (GoB, 2008).  This created the need for large-
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scale disease monitoring and control, especially in rural areas with little 
infrastructure even prior to the disaster.  In only 20 days (from December 27, 2007, 
to January 15, 2008), the spread of these diseases resulted in the requirement to 
treat over 3,500 cases of diarrhea, over 7,500 cases of skin disease, over 3,200 
respiratory tract infections, over 2,300 eye infections, and over 10,000 cases of 
typhoid fever.  Additionally 1,787 injuries were treated by medical responders during 
this time (GoB, 2008).  The absence of an epidemic of diarrhea and other illnesses 
proved a testimony to the effectiveness of rapid response of basic aid such as clean 
drinking water, food, and temporary shelter (Tod et al., 2008).  
6. Collaboration and Governance 
Bangladesh utilized established organizations for disaster warning as well as 
disaster relief.  Immediately following the cyclone, the government remained 
operational and began providing aid to affected areas.  Notably, the Cyclone 
Preparedness Programme and Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, 
both under the Ministry of Disaster Management, had established relief procedures 
and capabilities (Sarkar, 2009).  Coordinating with these agencies would have likely 
alleviated much of the friction between responders and the host nation’s authorities. 
Clearly defined authority, as well as established geographic boundaries of 
responsibilities, were not created among international responders, which created a 
lack of unity of effort and collaboration among organizations providing aid (Sarkar, 
2009).   
Marine after-action analysis also concluded that measures of effectiveness 
need to be defined and established early as a means of setting clear and attainable 
goals to limit the scope and duration of operations and developing transition criteria.  
Additionally, the relief efforts highlighted the importance of clearly stating and 
ensuring mutual understanding of transition criteria for USMC responders.  These 
measurable set criteria should be developed and announced as early as possible to 
prevent the Marine Corps from becoming entangled in operations, as well as the 
possibility of overextending their welcome from the host nation’s government (CE 3D 
MAW, 2008). 
The Red Crescent noted successes in long-term response coordination by 
participating in joint assessment teams with the government of Bangladesh to 
evaluate four of the most severely damaged districts (IFRC, 2010).  The sharing of 
inventories of aid supplies with the government of Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster 
through the use of the Disaster Management Information Center also improved 
collaboration between NGOs and host-nation recovery efforts.  This database of 
inventory facilitated information sharing and improved overall HA/DR operations 
(Tatham et al., 2009). 
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The United Nations experienced delays in completing initial needs 
assessments as well as implementing relief through the cluster system due to weak 
collaboration between the local government and NGOs.  Early setbacks in the 
evaluation of the disaster caused the United Nations relief operations to fall behind 
the tempo achieved by other more autonomous responding organizations such as 
CARE. Furthermore, the United Nations’s cluster approach was not adequately 
coordinated with the government of Bangladesh, which led to the host nation’s 
reluctance to implement the United Nations’s relief operations (Tod et al., 2008). 
The Marine Corps noted that Bangladesh created helicopter landing zones 
(HLZs) prior to the cyclone in the event of a disaster, but information on the locations 
and details provided to the MEB were often incorrect.  Prior to engaging in HA/DR 
operations within a country, HLZs should be discussed, and standard reporting 
information, including a 10-digit grid location, should be validated.  Ensuring that a 
Bangladeshi liaison officer accompanied each HLZ delivery alleviated confusion in 
reference to the correct drop zone and avoided further delay of support (CE 3D 
MEB, 2008). 
Finally, the arming of Marines proved to be a point of friction.  It was 
recommended that the Department of State accept the requirement for Marines to 
carry weapons and acknowledge the commander’s authority and responsibility to 
protect their forces.  The location of command headquarters was described as a 
critical enabler for establishing control over an area as well as coordinating with all 
responders.  Furthermore, the inclusion of NGOs and other agencies in planning and 
communications was vital in achieving a coordinated response.  The lead agency 
should be used as a representative for all similar groups (agencies, NGOs, 
militaries), which is likely to limit congestion and enhance organization (CE 3D 
MAW, 2008). 
Table 3 summarizes the HA/DR operations of the MEU and identifies demand 
that remained unmet by the entire relief efforts of Cyclone Sidr in 2007.  
Furthermore, Table 3 identifies capabilities organic to the MEU, which could be 
matched to this demand. 
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Table 3. Sea Angel II Demand and Supply 
(Based on Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 15) 
 
B. OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE (HAITI EARTHQUAKE) 
1. Information and Knowledge Management 
Throughout the initial relief efforts by both civilian and military organizations, 
Blackberry and cellular devices provided a simple and effective means of distributing 
information and coordinating efforts among responders (Webster, 2010).  The use of 
unclassified and plaintext communications was a necessity to facilitate the sharing of 
information among agencies.  This capability required a significant up-front 
investment in the communication equipment but presented an easy-to-use and 
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The overall requirement for detailed information about needs for relief 
services was significant, especially during the emergency response phase of 
operations.  The need from NGOs and responders for up-to-date information about 
the situation on the ground in Port-au-Prince was required in order to provide the 
appropriate type of aid in the right locations (DiOrio, 2010).   
USAID and high-level U.S. military units were burdened by policy-makers and 
strategic leaders with a constant stream of information requests about the 
operational picture of Haiti.  These requests were time consuming and exhaustive 
and forced commanders to allocate manpower from relief operations to fact-finding 
missions, which provided minimal value to overall operations (DiOrio, 2010). 
The decision to use unclassified networks was made early by USSOCOM and 
greatly increased the ease of information sharing and transfer.  The use of civilian 
software programs such as Google Maps and Google Earth was widespread to map 
activities and locations (DiOrio, 2010).  Military intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities such as aerial drones and satellite imagery were 
used by the military to augment the information gathered from civilian programs.  By 
deciding to use unclassified communications, the U.S. military was able to take 
advantage of both open-source as well as military information gathering and 
management resources (DiOrio, 2010). 
The detailed information and intelligence gathered by troops on the ground was 
invaluable for developing the operational picture of the relief effort (DiOrio, 2010).  
Specifically, Marines from the 22d MEU and soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division 
provided timely and detailed updates to infrastructure as well as human terrain.  
Troops were able to identify demand requirements by interfacing with local 
leadership and personnel in order to evaluate and report support requirements 
(DiOrio, 2010). 
2. Needs Assessment 
During the first 72 hours of planning, USSOCOM based relief operations on 
educated guesses of what relief was demanded as a result of the earthquake 
(DiOrio, 2010).  After initial operations commenced, the demand assessment was 
further refined as the operational picture was developed.  The push approach to 
relief response facilitated an aggressive time line of deployment and adequately fit 
the situation due to the massive scale of demand.  Furthermore, delaying response 
time would likely be more detrimental than slight inefficiencies in response supply 
(DiOrio, 2010).  
The MEU reconnaissance platoon was implemented to conduct an 
assessment of remote and austere areas.  Using organic skills and resources, the 
platoon was successful in establishing HLZs while directing follow-on aircraft to 
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deliver relief support including the transport of medical teams.  Carrying only 
essential gear, the reconnaissance teams were able to conduct longer missions and 
achieve high levels of maneuverability, enhancing the effectiveness of their 
assessments and ultimately resulting in required relief being provided where it was 
needed (Battalion Landing Team 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines, 22nd Marine 
Expeditionary Unit [BLT 3/2, 22d MEU], 2010).  Significantly, the MEU discovered 
that in permissive environments where the locals welcome the assistance, 
reconnaissance units are capable of being used for evaluations and assessments 
outside of kinetic operational environments. 
3. Supply 
Immediately after the earthquake struck, the local population was focused on 
immediate search and rescue operations and basic recovery.  However, after the 
initial shock of the incident dissipated, civil unrest became an apparent issue 
(DiOrio, 2010).  Without the arrival of basic aid, the affected areas were left without 
fuel, power, communications, food, or water and soon began to experience turmoil 
and instability.  Since Haiti’s infrastructure was extremely limited before the 
earthquake struck, the destruction of virtually all government capabilities created a 
chaotic environment (DiOrio, 2010).  This issue was compounded by the destruction 
of the Prison Civile in Port-au-Prince, which subsequently enabled the release of 
over 4,000 inmates into the city.  With convicted criminals running free combined 
with a devastated population with severe shortages in basic services and virtually no 
governing authority, the stability of Port-au-Prince quickly deteriorated into an 
insecure and anarchical state (DiOrio, 2010).   
Since the local population predominantly spoke only Creole, a language 
barrier was established between victims and U.S. military members.  NGOs provided 
translators, which allowed for the collaboration between responders and victims.  
The translators were especially useful for medical relief and non-transactional relief 
projects (DiOrio, 2010). 
At three days after the earthquake, security in Port-au-Prince became a major 
concern. Stemming from the shortage of food and water supplies delivered by relief 
efforts, violence first erupted from gang activity against aid distribution trucks.  The 
instability soon spread to mob violence against aid workers and especially supply 
trucks (DiOrio, 2010).  Crowds at distribution points turned violent and resorted to 
throwing stones at aid workers.  As a result, United Nations peacekeepers were 
forced to use rubber bullets, tear gas, batons, and pepper spray to control crowds at 
distribution points.  World Food Organization convoys were also experiencing looting 
and attacks from bandits along supply routes, which caused them to request United 
Nations escorts (DiOrio, 2010).  In an effort to reduce the insecurity, the United 
Nations requested and received over 300 military policemen from European 
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countries to restore order in Port-au-Prince.  Meanwhile, the U.S. military continued 
to provide local security at the seaport and airport AoRs (DiOrio, 2010).  
Power generators were particularly useful for command centers, and fuel 
support became an issue.  Because of a lack of military generators, many 
commands relied upon contractor generators, which required MoGas.  The fuel for 
the MEUs was provided by the ARG, which provided only JP-5 and JP-8 fuel types.  
By ensuring that each company level unit is equipped with a military power 
generator, the friction caused by non-compatible fuels could be eliminated and 
bolster self-sustainability (BLT 3/2, 22d MEU, 2010). 
Over the course of the main relief operations in Haiti, responders provided a 
total of 4.9 million meals, 17 million pounds of food, and 2.6 million bottles of water 
(Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2010).  Over one million people were 
provided shelter, the streets over 80 city blocks were cleared of debris, and 40,000 
buildings were evaluated by engineers (DiOrio, 2010). 
Overall, the ARG and MEUs were able to deliver 950 gallons of fuel, 163,523 
gallons of drinking water, 4.48 million pounds of rations, 19,000 pounds of medical 
supplies, and 10,600 pounds of non-food supplies (Bataan Amphibious Ready 
Group, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit [BATARG/22d MEU], 2010). 
Several deficiencies in equipment were noted by the responding MEUs as 
well.  Most importantly, concertina wire and engineer stakes were in high demand 
and out of supply (BLT 3/2, 22d MEU, 2010).  This shortfall presented a serious 
problem since a key tenet of distributing relief is ensuring that order is preserved at 
the distribution site.  Concertina wire, when reinforced by engineer stakes, is an 
excellent personnel barrier and can facilitate an environment of peace and order 
while providing protection and security.  Additionally, hanging shower bags, hygiene 
kits, sunscreen, and hand sanitizer were in short supply (BLT 3/2, 22d MEU, 2010).  
A lack of hygiene in a third world country can lead to medical issues and attrite a 
force of responders, reducing their ability to conduct HA/DR operations.  
4. Deployment and Distribution 
When evaluating the relief operations conducted, it is clear that the Marine 
Corps was challenged to assemble the required forces due to the operational 
engagements.  The 22d MEU was extended from a recent deployment, the 24th 
MEU was temporarily reassigned from a U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 
mission, and APS-10 was routed from a mission to the Horn of Africa.  Ultimately, 
the 22d MEU formed the main effort of the Marine response, since the 24th MEU 
and APS-10 were not assigned to the JTF throughout the duration of the task force’s 
operation (CE II MEF, 2010). 
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The use of MV-22 aircraft, seven-ton MTVR trucks with extended beds, and 
high-back HMMWV trucks emerged as a critical asset for distributing relief supplies 
and executing the logistics strategy.  The high-back HMMWVs were particularly 
useful in reaching remote or densely populated areas due to their relatively small 
frame and maneuverability (BLT 3/2, 22d MEU, 2010).  It also became apparent that 
in order to effectively distribute supplies, distribution sites need to be prepared prior 
to the arrival of supplies, including perimeter control, lines, entry points, crowd 
segregation, and so on.  Marines were best utilized for outer cordon security, while 
local authorities were best implemented as an inner cordon where they could best 
handle the individual situations due to their cultural knowledge and ability to speak 
the local language (CE II MEF, 2010). 
The U.S. Army’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division 
was tasked to mediate between the demand for relief and the supply of relief 
provided by a multitude of responders.  The BCT noted that the most effective 
means of matching the demand and supply was the eBay Effect, wherein the BCT 
served most critically as an intermediary by identifying demand and matching it to 
suppliers (Webster, 2010).  This was accomplished through an Excel database that 
classified locations of demand such as medical and food distribution facilities.  
These demand points were then supplied by coordinating with relief organizations to 
provide required goods and services.  The database was termed the humanitarian 
assistance common operational picture (HCOP) and was used to organize the 
plethora of information used to enhance the efficiency of relief supply distribution 
(Webster, 2010). 
Once the airport was repaired and functional, it became a major means for 
supplies to arrive in Haiti.  As supplies began to flow into the airport, a logjam was 
created at the edge of the Port-au-Prince airport (DiOrio, 2010).  Since the local 
response area was established at the airport but did not expand into the adjacent 
city, supplies and logistics ended at the edge of the airport area.  The resulting 
congestion and lack of stability in the city adversely impacted the distribution of 
medical supplies and care as well as other aid to the affected area (DiOrio, 2010). 
Since the roads and infrastructure in the city were largely destroyed and 
distribution accordingly degraded, clusters of relief facilities were established 
immediately surrounding the airport since supplies were available in that area 
(DiOrio, 2010).  This logistics cluster hampered the distribution of relief into the city 
of Port-au-Prince by preventing the flow and dissemination of materials.  Within the 
first week of relief operations, virtually all distribution of relief aid beyond the airport 
area was accomplished through the U.S. military since NGOs lacked adequate 
means of lift or transportation (DiOrio, 2010). 
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The U.S. military was criticized by USAID for its distribution of life-sustaining 
supplies during the first days of relief when search and rescue operations were the 
priority.  USAID concluded that the military is more proficient at search and rescue 
operations than aid distributions and should be utilized accordingly (DiOrio, 2010). 
5. Health Service Support 
By the second day after the quake, the existing mortuary facilities were over 
capacity and the tens of thousands of casualties created by the disaster created a 
significant health concern (DiOrio, 2010).  Bodies were piled in the streets and 
quickly rotting due to the hot, tropical conditions of the Caribbean nation, which 
threatened the sanitation and health of survivors throughout the city.  Without 
sufficient mortuary services, bodies were hastily moved by whatever means 
available to shallow, mass graves created just north of the city (DiOrio, 2010).  
These graves were nothing more than massive trenches dug into the countryside by 
excavation equipment, into which massive numbers of corpses were dumped and 
buried.  In some cases, bodies were simply dumped in the open at the grave sites by 
dump trucks, giving rise to millions of flies and the spread of disease (Ghosh, 2010). 
At three days after the earthquake, any remaining medical facilities were 
inundated by casualties and medical supplies and personnel were in severe 
shortage.  Furthermore, as victims migrated from the Port-au-Prince region to the 
border of the Dominican Republic to seek refuge, all medical facilities along the way 
quickly became overwhelmed by the masses of victims in need of medical care 
(DiOrio, 2010). 
Navy corpsmen were also an invaluable asset during Marine patrolling 
operations, since corpsmen were able to treat minor injuries on the spot, which 
improved community relations immediately.  Once food and water distribution was 
established, corpsmen provided tangible relief to individuals throughout the 
devastated area.  Corpsmen have the capability to provide medical aid relief while 
gaining the trust of local nationals; therefore, we can improve the effectiveness of 
operations by ensuring that corpsmen are located within units on the ground (BLT 
3/2, 22d MEU, 2010). 
Field sanitation and latrine facilities for American military forces were lacking 
during the operation.  Contracted sanitation companies were not available, which 
created a gap between the requirements of the approximately 400 U.S. personnel 
aboard the base camp.  Burn barrels were ordered but took an additional four days 
to arrive.  This could have been avoided by equipping personnel with waste bags 
and sanitation equipment prior to debarkation from the ships (CO, SCMAGTF, APS-
10, 2010). 
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As a result of airfield congestion, medical facilities and supplies clustered 
around the airport in order to access the medical supplies being delivered to the 
airport (DiOrio, 2010).  With a lack of distribution of supplies to field hospitals located 
in the city, those facilities operated with diminished levels of care, often performing 
surgeries and amputations without anesthesia and reusing latex gloves.  With the 
bulk of medical care facilities located around the airport, casualties were forced to 
utilize any means necessary, including trucks, carts, and walking, to travel to the 
airport medical clusters in order to receive care (DiOrio, 2010).  The ARG 
administered 8,001 immunizations while providing medical treatment to 2,789 
patients (BATARG/22d MEU, 2010). 
6. Collaboration and Governance 
Since the majority of the Haitian government infrastructure was destroyed, the 
president and his cabinet staff met with international responders on a daily basis, but 
turmoil soon surfaced.  Questions of authority as well as a lack of decisive action 
and tasking by the government of Haiti by the fourth day after the earthquake 
resulted in a lack of direction and focus for responders from the Haitian government 
(DiOrio, 2010). 
With a multitude of nations as well as organizations responding to the 
earthquake, the United Nations assumed authority of aid efforts, and USAID was 
authorized to lead the interagency Haiti task force (DiOrio, 2010).  Additionally, the 
United Nations authorized the United States to use military forces to provide relief to 
the nation.  Specifically, the U.S. military was tasked with restoring and maintaining 
the seaports as well as the airport of Port-au-Prince and roads to distribute 
humanitarian aid.  The United Nations assumed responsibility for establishing law 
and order in the country (DiOrio, 2010).  
A civil affairs officer was noted as a particularly useful staff officer during the 
MEU’s response in Haiti (CE II MEF, 2010).  Working with local governments and 
infrastructure greatly amplified the efforts of Marine responders, and the civil affairs 
officer served as a vital link between responders and local leaders. 
The Office of Disaster Assistance, a subset of USAID, created the NGO 
coordination cell within four days after the disaster.  Unfortunately, limited resources 
such as personnel, as well as bureaucratic and political friction, limited the 
effectiveness of the office to liaise and collaborate with NGOs (DiOrio, 2010).  This 
office, however, provided a link between military and NGO responders in order to 
improve the overall humanitarian response. Liaison officers assigned to key 
organizations allowed cross-level communication to occur with USAID and NGOs 
and helped to increase levels of unity of effort, as well as collaboration of response 
(DiOrio, 2010). 
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The decision to allow such a large number of U.S. troops to respond to the 
disaster garnered disapproval from France and several South American nations, 
which resented the commanding role that the U.S. took in providing relief (DiOrio, 
2010).   
Collaboration was initially established at the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince 
and accomplished high levels of coordination between state actors and 
organizations.  However, as additional entities continued to flow into Haiti, the 
complexity of the collaboration quickly outgrew the facilities at the embassy (DiOrio, 
2010).  Ultimately, the JTF headquarters, consisting of tents and temporary 
structures, was constructed in a lot beside the embassy.  This location was beside 
the United Nations headquarters, which provided increased international 
collaboration throughout relief operations.  However, challenges to collaboration with 
NGOs persisted due to the sheer number of organizations operating within Haiti 
(DiOrio, 2010).  The close proximity of headquarters emerged as a critical factor in 
the success of collaboration since planning must be accomplished in environments 
with limited communication and information infrastructure (DiOrio, 2010).  The 
humanitarian assistance coordination cell (HACC) further exemplified this tenet while 
integrating military support into USAID operations.  A majority of the HACC 
members were sourced from military units, which provided a link between key 
military assets and USAID personnel while operating in one central area (DiOrio, 
2010).  
Table 4 shows the response operations completed by the USMC, as well as 
gaps in the overall HA/DR operations in support of the Haitian earthquake in 2010. 
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Table 4. Unified Response Demand and Supply 
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C. OPERATION TOMODACHI (JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI) 
1. Information and Knowledge Management 
Upon arriving off the coast of Japan, U.S. Navy aircraft successfully employed 
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to gather reconnaissance imagery of over 2,000 
square miles of ocean and coastal areas.  This information was critical for planning a 
response and identifying areas of demand and was used by both American and 
Japanese responders (Zielonka, 2012).  Unmanned aircraft additionally provided 
high-resolution imagery that was used in the development of the U.S. response plan 
(Wilson, 2012).  
These unmanned aerial drones also successfully provided information and 
monitoring of radiological levels around Fukushima and collected imagery of 
impacted regions to assist search and rescue efforts (Zielonka, 2012).  A specialized 
assessment team sourced from U.S. Northern Command conducted a ground 
assessment of the area surrounding the power plant in order to determine the extent 
of the fallout from the power plant meltdown. Also, U.S. Navy Radiological 
Assistance Team members monitored crew members aboard naval vessels for 
radiation and contamination (Zielonka, 2012).  Mapping the levels of radiation 
surrounding Fukushima using rotary-wing aircraft and then disseminating the 
information through a combined Japanese and American team facilitated the 
placement of relief personnel and reduced fears.  This was critical since an initial 
lack of knowledge of the extent of the nuclear disaster at Fukushima limited 
response measures and promulgated anxiety among local populations and 
responders (Wilson, 2012). 
Social networking, unclassified information, and media further assisted 
response efforts by educating the population about current situations while 
increasing legitimacy of the host nation (Carafano, 2011).  Although social media 
provided easy-to-use information sharing that achieved widespread communication 
between individuals, information was not validated, often resulting in the spreading 
of rumors and anxieties (Wilson, 2012).  Furthermore, a lack of information 
assurance and trust slowed response due to the unreliability of many intelligence 
sources.  The large scale of destruction and damage to communication 
infrastructure crippled the response effort.  Accurate, timely, and disseminated 
information emerged as a necessity for effective relief efforts (Carafano, 2011). 
In addition to dissemination, information about radiation levels from the 
nuclear power plant was difficult to convey to the public since the population lacked 
specific knowledge to accurately interpret the information.  This stressed the need 
for easily understandable means for conveying complex information to the public 
(Carafano, 2011). 
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Finally, the Japanese government discovered that withholding disaster 
information, specifically regarding nuclear radiation, from media sources caused the 
local population to lose trust and, in some cases, express animosity toward the 
government (The Heritage Foundation [THF], 2012).  In countries with less 
functioning infrastructure and societal order, this animosity could lead to instability 
and limit relief operations. 
2. Needs Assessment 
Since the sheer size and severity of the disaster overwhelmed primary and 
backup local response measures, local organizations were unable to accurately 
evaluate and measure levels of damage and needs.  Accordingly, satellite imagery 
was requested early by the Japanese government in order to measure the scale of 
the destruction caused by the tsunami (Norio, Ye, Kajitani, Shi, & Tatano, 2011).  
American aerial assets conducted numerous aerial reconnaissance missions, which 
further identified remote groups of stranded victims as well as damage to 
infrastructure within impacted regions.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also 
provided critical assistance in assessing the damage to the Japanese infrastructure 
within devastated regions after the tsunami (Zielonka, 2012). 
It was observed that initial inaccurate assessments of the radiation levels 
from Fukushima caused more problems than assistance by causing panic among 
the population (Carafano, 2011). This emphasizes the sensitivity of nuclear disasters 
as well as the need for accurate measures of the disaster. 
3. Supply 
The debris and destruction caused by the tsunami created a requirement to 
identify and clear underwater obstacles in ports and waterways on the Japanese 
coasts.  The U.S. Navy sourced salvage teams to detect and classify underwater 
obstacles and debris in key ports with specialized divers and equipment (Zielonka, 
2012). Specifically, side-scanning sonar devices were successfully implemented on 
LCACs and small vessels from the ARG and naval units to scan the Uranohama 
harbor for underwater obstructions.  Furthermore, Navy divers assisted in the 
reconstruction of a natural gas pier, allowing the delivery of natural gas fuel into the 
region (Zielonka, 2012). 
The seaport at Uranohama was inundated by debris caused by the tsunami, 
rendering the logistics hub non-capable.  By using the manpower of Marines from 
the 31st MEU, the port was restored in order to allow the flow of logistics into the 
local area (Zielonka, 2012). 
Many areas impacted by the tsunami were heavily populated and accordingly 
consisted of extensive civil infrastructure.  After the disaster, most of the 
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infrastructure and personal possessions were reduced to mass amounts of debris, 
which cluttered streets and existing structures (Zielonka, 2012).  This devastation 
created a need for extensive search and rescue operations and later debris 
clearance and removal.  Responders noted high levels of gratitude from victims 
when removing debris and, if possible, returning personal possessions (Zielonka, 
2012). 
Specifically, over 190,000 buildings were damaged, including over 45,000 
that were completely destroyed, creating over 250,000,000 tons of debris (Norio et 
al., 2011).  This led to the high demand for clearing operations, which were critical to 
restoring Japan’s infrastructure.  Furthermore, impacted areas suffered widespread 
power outages, leaving roughly 4.4 million families without electricity during 
inclement winter weather (Norio et al., 2011).  With large-scale power outages, 
energy generators were essential for reestablishing critical infrastructure such as 
airports and emergency facilities.  Accordingly, fresh water, blankets, and shelter 
were needed by survivors due to the destruction of infrastructure combined with 
inclement winter weather (Zielonka, 2012). 
The nuclear disaster at Fukushima created demand for specific goods and 
services for responding to such events.  Among these, radiological detection assets 
aboard naval vessels and aircraft were used to monitor the levels of nuclear fallout 
surrounding the power plant in order to ensure the safety of nearby populations and 
responding organizations (Zielonka, 2012).  U.S. Navy barges delivered hundreds of 
thousands of gallons of fresh water to cool the plant’s nuclear reactors (Zielonka, 
2012).  Additionally, radiation detectors and protection as well as emergency 
lanterns proved useful for victims in areas surrounding Fukushima (Norio et al., 
2011).  Populations within the danger radius of contamination required immediate 
evacuation and relocation shelter at a safe distance from the plant (Carafano, 2011).  
This created large, dislocated populations with no possessions or sustainment 
capabilities and in need of shelter and sustenance (THF, 2012). 
Regardless of the extent of existing infrastructure and governance, basic 
relief services such as search and rescue and debris clearance are always greatly 
demanded during the emergency response (Carafano, 2011).  Rice and bread was 
provided for victims as basic sustenance since most food stores were destroyed by 
the tsunami.  The refueling of aircraft on naval vessels, especially rotary-wing 
platforms, was required to support the extensive airlift operations while delivering aid 
and conducting information gathering (Zielonka, 2012). The U.S. Army’s use of small 
teams consisting of translators, communications experts, and medical personnel 
were effective in providing a small but immediate supply of communications and 
information as well as medical care (Feickert & Chanlett-Avery, 2011). 
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Challenges in matching supply to demand arose due to the disparity between 
delivery of relief and real-time need. For example, within the first week of the 
disaster, blankets, clothing, and drinking water were in high demand; however, after 
that week, the response supply of these items overwhelmed the demand and 
became a nuisance to the supply chain of aid (Holguín-Veras et al., 2011). Since the 
JSDF was operating over capacity, in some areas without a large JSDF presence, 
looting and a bank robbery were reported (Holguín-Veras et al., 2011).  
4. Deployment and Distribution 
The use of rotary-wing platforms played a monumental role in the distribution 
of supplies.  Helicopters provided critical lift capabilities to deliver a variety of relief 
supplies from naval vessels to distribution points (Zielonka, 2012).  They were also 
successful in completing ship-to-shore and follow-on movement of supplies, even 
when seaports and coastlines were devastated.  Rotary-wing aircraft were vital in 
providing last-mile distribution of relief to the impacted areas, especially those in 
remote and isolated locations (Zielonka, 2012). American rotary-wing aircraft even 
enhanced JSDF operations by transporting both supplies and personnel from JSDF 
ships to the disaster area (Wilson, 2012). This capability was essential since in 
areas struck by the tsunami, the majority of all roads, railways, and other lines of 
transportation were destroyed and rendered impassable, severely limiting 
distribution of relief (Norio et al., 2011). Seventy-six percent of highways and 600 
miles of high-speed rail network in affected areas were closed immediately following 
the flood (THF, 2012).  Since emergency supplies such as food, water, and medical 
aid generally must arrive within 72 hours of a disaster to prevent further loss of life 
(Carafano, 2011), rotary-wing lift capability was employed immediately to distribute 
aid throughout the region since other means were likely to be inadequate. 
U.S. helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and surface vessels were successfully 
used to search hundreds of miles of coastline for survivors and bodies among the 
debris after the flooding receded (Zielonka, 2012).  On land, HMMWVs, dump 
trucks, and water and fuel trucks successfully expedited seaport debris clearance 
operations since almost all local ground and water transportation assets were 
destroyed by the flood (Zielonka, 2012). Clearing debris from all highways and 
restoring use within two weeks of the disaster increased distribution of aid and 
transportation of personnel during continued relief operations (THF, 2012).  Private 
local trucking companies even volunteered their services in an attempt to meet the 
demand for distribution assets for relief supplies due to the lack of operable trucks 
once roadways were restored (Holguín-Veras et al., 2011). 
The Sendai Airport, as well as numerous seaports, was littered with large 
amounts of debris and left inoperable after the tsunami floodwaters receded, which 
prevented the delivery of international aid (Norio et al., 2011).  By clearing debris 
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from the airport and restoring its 5,000-foot runway and control capabilities, a vital 
logistics base was established within the disaster area, which enabled large-scale 
local delivery of aid from military and civilian aircraft (Wilson, 2012).  Additionally, 
using the functional airports outside of the disaster area as hubs for logistics 
distribution proved effective when combined with last-mile distribution assets such 
as rotary-wing aircraft (Norio et al., 2011).  External staging areas as far away as 
military air bases on Iwakuni and Okinawa were used effectively to avoid congestion 
and prepare supplies for the last stage of distribution (Wilson, 2012).  A major 
success of Operation Tomodachi was the scale of air support operations achieved.  
The 3d Marine Division air officer tracked over 800 sorties transporting over 3,000 
passengers and over 1,000 short tons of humanitarian supplies to the disaster area, 
including water, fuel, food, and blankets, which were critical to preventing loss of life 
(CE 3D MARDIV, 2011).  
Unfortunately, distribution operations were hindered by the government of 
Japan and the JSDF’s staunch position and national pride.  Instead of using local 
authorities for inner cordon security and end user distribution, the Japanese 
authorities demanded that supplies be brought to them and then they would 
distribute from central locations to local distribution points (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  This 
model reduced the transportation and distribution site creation requirements for the 
Marines of the 3D MEB.  Ultimately, the responders concluded that requirements 
need to be established for relief operations based on the strength of the 
infrastructure.  Specifically, missions, response measures, and capabilities for third 
world nations need to differ significantly from those of first world nations. 
5. Health Service Support 
As in most disasters, it was discovered that small children, elderly, sick, and 
poor victims were more susceptible to suffering (THF, 2012). The highest casualty 
rates were experienced in the Fukushima prefect and consisted mostly of elderly 
citizens due to their lack of mobility, resiliency, and self-sustainability (Japanese Red 
Cross Society, 2013). 
6. Collaboration and Governance 
Collaboration through treaties and policies between the U.S. military and the 
JSDF ensured high-level coordination between American and host-nation 
responders (Zielonka, 2012).  The JSDF quickly established its position of 
leadership and directed international responders to operate in specific areas in order 
to distribute relief.  An exchange of embedded liaison teams between the U.S. Navy 
and JSDF increased overall communication and cooperation between the U.S. 
military and host-nation organizations.  The 31st MEU sourced a three-man team in 
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exchange for a three-man Japanese team, each of which functioned within the 
operation planning sections of their counterpart’s organization (Zielonka, 2012). 
With a high concentration of both host and international agencies and relief 
organizations, achieving unity of effort and coordination was an arduous task.  A 
method for solving the problem known as Board, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and 
Working Groups (B2C2WG) was implemented by the JTF.  This concept focused on 
the scheduled meetings and conferences with key players in the relief effort to 
streamline coordination, improve synergy, and coordinate response (CE 3D 
MARDIV, 2011).  Early coordination between the U.S. embassy, USAID, and the 
Japanese government via the U.S. Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell 
streamlined and directly enabled the success of the American response during 
immediate and subsequent relief operations. Although successful, clear policies and 
procedures understood and implemented by both parties would have increased 
effectiveness (Wilson, 2012). 
By working together with the Japanese forces, American military units 
achieved several joint objectives and functioned in roles complementary to one 
another. During seaport restorations, once U.S. Navy salvage teams located 
underwater obstacles in ports, the coordinates and information were relayed to local 
officials in Kessenuma and Oshima for clearance operations (Zielonka, 2012).  While 
searching for human remains swept out to sea, U.S. responders maintained cultural 
sensitivity by reporting the location of remains to local forces to allow appropriate 
customary procedures to be conducted during the recovery operations and handling 
of human remains. Naval medical teams partnered with local Japanese teams also 
successfully provided a combined and effective assessment and location of service 
centers in response to the victims’ need for medical care (Zielonka, 2012). 
The nuclear disaster at Fukushima led to the involvement of numerous host-
nation and international nuclear organizations, which increased the demand for 
organization and coordination (Norio et al., 2011).  Further friction was added by the 
lack of continuity between the private Tokyo Electric Power Company, who owned 
the power plant, and host-nation government agencies.  These internal issues 
further challenged unity of effort with international organizations and reemphasized 
the requirement for well-executed coordination between all involved parties (Norio et 
al., 2011). 
A major factor influencing the scope of Operation Tomodachi was Japan’s 
infrastructure and standing as a first world nation.  Because Japan had well-
developed and well-executed emergency response plans, as well as resources and 
capabilities, aid was not as welcomed as it had been in past disasters where 
impoverished countries with incapable governments were affected.  Not all relief 
supplies were demanded, and the JSDF was often hesitant to relinquish control and 
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authority over relief operations (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  For example, the HASTs’ 
movement, although arriving in Japan within 24 hours, was delayed by seven days 
by Japanese civil authorities, which is most likely due to their reluctance to be 
viewed as needy (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  As a result, the relief effort was very 
straightforward and attempted to match demand with excess resources held by the 
government of Japan in other parts of the country.  The distribution modeling and 
matching of needed resources while operating under the control of the government 
of Japan and exerting significant effort in order to determine the actual needs of the 
host nation became a real challenge (CE 3D MEB, 2011).  The Japanese 
government later admitted that by not fully considering the capabilities of 
international organizations, they limited their overall resources and level of response.  
Overall, a JTF was useful in allocating resources and managing personnel, but 
establishing clear chains of command and authority to reduce redundancy of effort 
proved difficult (Wilson, 2012).  These inflexible emergency management 
procedures caused delays in the integration of foreign aid organizations and 
subsequently hampered the speed of response operations (Carafano, 2011).   
Table 5 depicts the relief supplied by the MEU as well as the total shortages 
in overall HA/DR operations in support of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 
2011. 
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Table 5. Tomodachi Demand and Supply 
(Based on Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 15) 
 
Even with the large-scale relief operations and tremendous levels of support 
provided by a host of multinational organizations and state actors, it is apparent that 
gaps in response persisted.  To supply this unmet demand created by the disasters, 
USMC MEUs could potentially use the following organic resources: 
 (1) S2 intelligence section 
 (1) civil affairs section 
 (1) CBRN detachment 
 (1) S6 communications section 
 (1) public affairs section   
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 (1) force reconnaissance platoon 
 (1) infantry battalion of Marines 
 (4) forklifts 
 (1) excavator 
 (105) HMMWVs 
 (19) rotary-wing aircraft 
 embedded Navy corpsmen 
 (1) military police detachment 
 (1) bulldozer 
 (31) MTVR trucks 
 (15) AAVs 
 (2) tactical water purification systems 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
After examining the previous cases, it is apparent that regardless of the 
disaster, there will likely be a high demand for life-sustaining relief such as food, 
water, and medical aid immediately following the event.  Since the MEU is 
specifically structured to enable rapid deployment anywhere in the world, immediate 
push-based logistics operations delivering food and water will likely provide high 
levels of utility to victims if delivered rapidly.  In order to provide further utility and 
enhance overall relief operations, the MEU is capable of employing capabilities in all 
categories of the Apte and Yoho model.  Matching the capabilities of the MEU with 
shortfalls in combined response is likely to increase the effectiveness of operations 
while ensuring that MEU resources are implemented efficiently.  Furthermore, by 
providing capabilities when other agencies cannot, the Marine Corps will establish its 
competitive advantage and function in foreign aid operations.  
Potential capabilities that the MEU can best employ to achieve this 
competitive advantage have been identified by determining the unmet demands from 
the three studied disasters.  Information and knowledge management capabilities 
lacked a method of mass communication to local populations, sufficient supply of 
cell phones and personal communication devices, validated information reports, and 
accurately disseminated reports of radiation.  The MEU’s S2 intelligence section is 
capable of providing validated information products, while the S6 communication 
section can facilitate communication and information dissemination operations.  
Organic public and civil affairs officers along with their staff specialize in managing 
and communicating information between the MEU chain of command and external 
organizations.  Furthermore, the MEU’s rotary-wing assets, including MV-22 
Ospreys and CH-53 and UH-1 helicopters, could distribute mass notifications.  
Shortfalls in demand for needs assessment included the completion of assessments 
in remote and isolated areas as well as accurate detection of radiation levels 
surrounding the Fukushima power plant during Operation Tomodachi.  
Reconnaissance platoons as well as the infantry battalion from the MEU are capable 
of reaching isolated and austere areas and identifying the needs of victims through 
interaction.  For radiation detection, the MEU’s CBRN section would not have been 
able to meet this demand due to the scale of the disaster, but it would be able to 
provide detection in certain areas. 
The initial lack of drinking water caused by disasters could be alleviated in 
part by the use of the MEU’s two tactical water purifiers until other relief agencies 
arrive.  When stability is compromised and relief distribution is hampered by looting, 
violence, and unrest, the Marine Corps’ manpower resources provide an ample 
solution.  The infantry battalion of Marines and especially the military police platoon 
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are capable of restoring order and providing security spanning across the force 
continuum.  Furthermore, the presence of Marines is likely to maintain order at relief 
camps and prevent crimes against at-risk populations such as women, children, the 
sick, and the elderly.  The manpower of the MEU combined with equipment assets 
could also be effectively used in search and rescue as well as debris clearance 
operations.  The battalion landing team as well as four forklifts, one bulldozer, one 
excavator, 31 seven-ton trucks, 105 HMMWVs, and 15 amphibious assault vehicles 
(AAVs) could provide significant capabilities, search a significant area, and clear 
large amounts of debris and rubble to restore critical infrastructure and facilitate 
additional relief distribution.  
The distribution of relief was shown to be particularly challenging to most aid 
organizations due to the devastated environments they were operating in.  The 
distribution to locations beyond logistics hubs plagued most responders due to their 
lack of lift capabilities.  Most significantly, the MEU’s 19 rotary-wing aircraft have 
been proven capable of accomplishing the critical task of delivering supplies and 
personnel to areas inaccessible by land transportation.  By providing last-mile 
distribution in future operations, the MEU’s aircraft can serve as a critical enabler to 
organizations such as USAID, the World Food Organization, and the Red Cross.  In 
areas where ground transportation is possible, the 31 seven-ton trucks, 105 
HMMWVs, and 15 AAVs can transport large quantities of relief supplies and 
personnel over strenuous terrain.  The four forklifts possessed by the MEU can also 
be used at logistics hubs for the loading and unloading of cargo since local 
equipment is often inoperable or lost after a disaster.  Additionally, due to the nature 
of relief operations, the creation and maintenance of order at distribution sites is 
paramount, but also difficult to achieve.  The Marines of the MEU, working with host 
nations or autonomously, can establish secured and orderly distribution sites to 
ensure the safe and effective flow of aid.  
The shortage of mobile medical teams could be partially met by the use of 
embedded Navy corpsmen with Marine ground troops.  As noted in Haiti, embedded 
corpsmen were able to reach victims in remote locations who were unable to travel 
to medical facilities.  Although care is limited to basic aid, the services provide 
immediate assistance and contribute to needs assessments for follow-on relief.  
Finally, the lack of unity of effort, overall response collaboration, and clear AoRs can 
be improved through the use of the MEU’s civil affairs and public affairs sections.  
Although the MEU will likely only be able to improve levels of collaboration between 
itself and other large organizations who are willing to cooperate, improving combined 
response will lead to improved levels of relief being provided to victims.  Improving 
collaboration will also allow the MEU to better match its capabilities and supplies 
with the needs of victims while reducing redundancy and inefficiency. 
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A. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
 Conduct a cost analysis using the previously mentioned metric to 
determine cost effectiveness within the scope of meeting demand 
shortages, as opposed to assuming that all aid provided was 
necessary. Determine waste/excess and cost of superfluous and 
redundant aid. 
 Conduct an analysis of HA/DR-specific tasking statements versus 
broad statements with specific mission requirements and focus areas. 
 Develop specific MEU command/staff training exercises and playbooks 
that focus on HA/DR competencies. 
Conduct an analysis of the maximum utility of an MEU response time 
line and identification of diminishing returns based on the duration of 
operations. 
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